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European Review [redacted] 25X1

28 August 1985

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European Review

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28 August 1985

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After a spring and summer heavy with criticism, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl will attempt to overcome his government's declining popularity when the capital returns to work this fall. Efforts are likely to range from cabinet changes to economic stimulants to a campaign against the alleged anti-Americanism of the opposition Social Democrats. Yet, unless Kohl can lower significantly the country's high unemployment rate, these efforts may well fail. Continuing divisions within the coalition over economic and foreign policy will not make the task any easier. On balance, however, we believe that Kohl is safe for now. No logical successor is in the wings, he has yet to be implicated personally in the spy scandal, and it would be difficult to replace him in time for a new chancellor to establish himself before the next federal election.

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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as uncoordinated views.

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Briefs

United Kingdom

Possible Split at Trade Union Congress 25X1

The British Trades Union Congress (TUC) may split during its annual conference in September. The TUC recently completed an investigation into the acceptance by two unions—the electricians and engineers—of government funds to cover the costs of conducting secret ballots, a practice forbidden by the Congress because it implies acquiescence to Tory trade union reform laws. The threat of expulsion from the TUC notwithstanding, the Electricians Union has also entered into a controversial "one union, no strike" agreement with a newspaper publisher. This move has angered printing unions with whom the publisher previously had labor problems. The debate over expulsion therefore will be a contentious issue at the conference. 25X1

TUC officials who were hoping to avoid a split at the annual conference may find it difficult to reach a solution that would appease the radical left, who are demanding expulsion. Even moderate officials have expressed some annoyance at the two unions. The electricians nonetheless seem unconcerned, while the engineers have said little about the dispute. The expulsion of the electricians and engineers unions could lead to the creation of a second national federation of unions, particularly if the Nottinghamshire miners, who are threatening to leave their national union, should decide to join their brethren. Even if a compromise can be reached, this intraunion bickering is troublesome for Labor Party leader Kinnock, who needs cooperation among trade unions for financial and political support in his drive to reestablish Labor as the only viable alternative to the Conservatives. 25X1

West Germany

State Election Analysis 25X1

The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered heavy losses among women, pensioners, and young voters in this spring's North Rhine–Westphalia election. According to official statistics released in late July, only a third of the women voters and 30 percent of youths under 25 supported the Christian Democrats. The party's worst showing—25 percent—was among those between 25 and 35 years old. The CDU's strongest support came from voters over 60, but, even among this group, it performed more poorly than in the past. 25X1

This demographic breakdown may be even more worrisome to the national CDU than its record-low overall performance in the state election. Women once disproportionately supported the Christian Democrats, but their share of the CDU vote has fallen markedly in the last few national elections. The party also is facing increasing difficulties in attracting young voters, despite a surprisingly strong

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performance in 1983. The CDU thus will need to appeal more than ever to older voters in 1987, but the North Rhine–Westphalia results suggest that even their support for the Christian Democrats is weakening. 25X1

West Germany–USSR

Protests at the Moscow Youth Festival 25X1

West German sensitivity over the country's ties to West Berlin became evident again this summer as West Germans of nearly every political stripe reacted angrily to an attempt by Soviet organizers to separate the West Berlin and West German delegations at the opening ceremonies of the Moscow Youth Festival. Contrary to prior agreements, the Soviets permitted a Communist group from West Berlin to enter the stadium as the official delegation from the city. Non-Communist members of the West German delegation—approximately 75 percent—immediately protested the move, withdrew from the opening ceremony, and suspended participation in festival activities for a day. At one point, the West German group even considered leaving Moscow altogether but reconsidered when Soviet organizers apologized for the "technical foulup." 25X1

Particularly noteworthy was the unanimity of the West German and West Berlin response, with nearly all observers protesting the transparent Soviet attempt to treat West Berlin as a separate political entity. The conservative West German press and politicians were the most vehement, and government spokesman Norbert Schaeffer cited the affair as a violation of the Quadripartite Agreement. US officials in Bonn and West Berlin noted, however, that objections were voiced by Social Democratic and Green representatives as well. Even such radical-leftists as the Young Socialists and the Alternatives condemned the move, commenting on the dangers inherent in trying to work with Moscow, East Berlin, and their Communist frontmen in the western half of the city. 25X1

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Norway

National Election Approaches 25X1

Norway's ruling Conservative Party–led coalition will likely win the election on 9 September, although the race is certain to be close. The Labor Party, Norway's dominant political force for a decade until the last election in 1981, recently has had trouble attracting voters. Falling unemployment and inflation and rising GNP growth over the past few years are reinforcing the public's view that the Conservatives are more adept at handling national finances. Moreover, a general move to the right—which the Norwegians have labeled the "conservative wave"—has occurred among the electorate over the past few years. 25X1

Even if the coalition does not win a clear majority, it is still likely to gain a plurality of seats and, with Progressive Party support, form a minority government. A Conservative coalition would maintain close relations with NATO and the United States. A Labor victory, on the other hand, probably would result in a one-party government that would need parliamentary support from the Socialist Left and Liberal parties. While a Labor government would continue to support NATO membership, it almost certainly would oppose SDI participation and INF deployment, as well as promote a Nordic nuclear free zone. 25X1

Turkey

Merger of Leftist Parties 25X1

Turkey's two main left-of-center political parties—the Populist Party (PP) and the Social Democracy Party (SODEP)—agreed to merge on 31 July. Joint committees are working out details of the merger, and a joint platform will be devised—a process not expected to be completed for approximately six months. The PP ran second to Prime Minister Ozal's Conservative Motherland Party (ANAP) in the 1983 general election and now holds 114 seats in the 400-member parliament; its present head, Aydin Guven Gurkan, is expected to lead the two parties during the

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unification period. SODEP, barred by the military from participating in the general election, showed its strength among left-of-center voters by finishing second to ANAP in local elections in 1984, with 24 percent of the vote.

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The union will benefit both parties. The PP will be able to gain legitimacy and overcome the stigma of being a tame leftist party sanctioned by the military. SODEP will gain representation in parliament, denied it in 1983. The new party, however, is unlikely to be a political threat to the Ozal government in the immediate future; left-of-center parties traditionally receive only about 30 percent of the Turkish vote. Should Ozal come under increasing criticism for domestic problems, especially failure to improve the economy, however, the situation may change. An added factor that cannot be gauged at this time is the willingness of the military to stay behind the scenes if the new party gains strength too rapidly.

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Poland

Underground Publishing

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Polish security officials in recent months have had increased success in shutting down thriving underground publishing operations. In late May, authorities arrested three men and confiscated two presses after raiding a Warsaw-area printshop run by NOWA, Poland's largest underground publishing house. In mid-June the security police (SB) picked up 10 of the leading contributors to the underground journal *Krytyka* at their homes. Later in June, the Polish press announced a major raid against an underground publishing house in Wroclaw, detention of a group of distributors in Poznan, and indictment of a distributor of illegal publications in Bielssko-Biala. This followed several raids that took place last October and November.

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The Jaruzelski regime seems likely to continue its intensive efforts against the underground press, trying in particular to curb the underground's opportunities to stir up popular opposition to the coming parliamentary elections in October. However, the government has a long way to go in eliminating underground publishing, since estimates that more than 100,000 people are involved in the writing, publication, and distribution of illegal material. Because underground publishing is so widespread, authorities have often been forced to employ other tactics besides making immediate arrests.

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Officials also have attempted to intimidate low-level activists by warning them of the extent of government knowledge of the underground publishing network and threatening arrest if they do not cease their participation. Despite all the regime's efforts, the underground press probably will continue to produce and distribute a large number of illegal publications since there appears to be no shortage of volunteers to replace arrested activists.

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Bulgaria

Slow Economic Revival 25X1

The Bulgarian economy is still struggling to recover from dislocations caused by last winter's harsh weather. The Zhivkov regime reinstated in late July household electricity rationing first imposed during last winter's energy crisis. 25X1 Bulgaria has been buying coal and oil on international markets because supplies from the Soviet Union are smaller than in previous years. Insufficient rainfall this year has curtailed hydroelectric generation and irrigation and forced Sofia to impose strict water conservation measures. The drought and winterkill also have caused a drop in this year's grain production. Bulgaria, usually a net wheat exporter, is reportedly trying to purchase grain from Argentina and China, and the government has urged reduced consumption of bread and other foodstuffs. 25X1 25X1

According to official economic data released in July, the energy, metallurgy, chemical, and construction industries fell short of planned targets in the first half of the year. Although bad weather contributed to the shortfalls, the problem was complicated by waste, poor worker discipline, management errors, and inadequate technology. Measures to increase production—including a compulsory six-day workweek since April and exhortations to work harder—may be having some effect. A regime report in early August noted a "steady trend toward improvement." 25X1

East Germany

Warm Farewell to US Envoy 25X1

East Germany gave US Ambassador Ridgway a relatively upbeat sendoff last month, signaling its continuing interest in improving relations with the United States. In contrast to the cursory treatment accorded the previous US Envoy's departure in January 1983, Ambassador Ridgway's visit with East German leader Erich Honecker received both television and press coverage. The press also mentioned her talks with the GDR's second in command, Willi Stoph. East German officials also hosted an elaborate farewell reception, an honor rarely bestowed on representatives from OECD countries other than West Germany. The Ambassador also met with Egon Krenz, Honecker's most likely successor, becoming only the second US official to do so. 25X1

The warm sendoff reflects East German awareness of Ridgway's nomination to be Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs as well as an interest in progress in relations that has been apparent since Politburo member Hemran Axen and other GDR officials received Assistant Secretary of State Burt in February 1984. Despite recent Soviet press criticism of attempts by small Communist states to intermediate between the United States and the USSR, the East Germans may hope at least to contribute to improved superpower relations. They probably also see better relations with the United States as a small step toward reduced dependence on the Soviets. Nevertheless, press coverage of the Ambassador's visit with Honecker highlighted criticism of SDI, signaling that East German policy remains firmly pro-Soviet and that progress in bilateral relations will be influenced by prospects for US-Soviet relations. 25X1

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Articles

West Germany: Possible Tears of Autumn for Kohl

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After a spring and summer heavy with criticism, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl will attempt to overcome his government's declining popularity when the capital returns to work this fall. Efforts are likely to range from cabinet changes to economic stimulants to a campaign against the alleged anti-Americanism of the opposition Social Democrats. Yet, unless Kohl can lower significantly the country's high unemployment rate, these efforts may well fail. Continuing divisions within the coalition over economic and foreign policy will not make the task any easier. On balance, however, we believe that Kohl is safe for now. No logical successor is in the wings, he has yet to be implicated personally in the spy scandal, and it would be difficult to replace him in time for a new chancellor to establish himself before the next federal election.

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The Summer of Discontent

The spy scandal that erupted recently is only one of the challenges the Chancellor faces. His problems began to multiply around May of this year as his government stumbled from one fiasco to another. During the early weeks of May, the government was profoundly criticized over its management of the Economic Summit in Bonn and of the visit by President Reagan. In the former case, Kohl's outspoken endorsement of a new round of trade negotiations and the US program on SDI research surprised and angered French President Mitterrand; observers generally commented that Kohl needlessly had damaged Franco-German relations. In the latter case, Kohl's insistence on the visit to the Bitburg cemetery, where a number of SS graves were discovered later, pointed to shoddy preparation and tactless behavior; criticism that Kohl had put the US President at a disadvantage domestically, while indebting himself deeply to the United States, was common in the country's press.

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To make matters worse, in a state election on 12 May, the Christian Democrats suffered their worst showing ever in West Germany's most populous state, North Rhine–Westphalia. The Social Democrats swept to an absolute majority about 52 percent behind their popular Minister-President Johannes Rau, while the Christian Democrats' share of the vote dropped to about 36 percent. This followed a CDU defeat in the Saar two months earlier. Most of the blame for the loss was laid on the Kohl government in general and the Chancellor in particular. Kohl had pressed for the appointment of the CDU's lackluster leader in the state, Bernhard Worms, and most commentators agreed that the election could be seen as a popular statement on the status of the Kohl government at midterm.

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Protests against the government's seeming inability to address the issue of unemployment and the government's general image of bungling incompetence became commonplace, many emanating from within the governing parties. Local CDU chapters in North Rhine–Westphalia, as well as the state committee in the Saar, openly blamed the government in Bonn for their poor showing. US diplomats reported that in June the government and Chancellor even came in for serious criticism, which at times erupted in booing at a convention of the Christian Democrats' youth organization. Leaders of Bavaria's Christian Social Union—quick to find fault with Kohl in any event—attacked the government's faulty economic policies and lack of leadership as well. Kohl's standing in public opinion polls also dropped to the worst showing ever for a West German chancellor, and the Christian

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Democrats even fell behind the opposition Social Democrats on the traditional "Sunday" question.[1]

In a series of hastily arranged meetings, Kohl attempted to halt the intracoalition bickering and barrage of criticism while creating an image of action. In early June he met with CSU leader Strauss, and the two then met a week later with Free Democratic leader Martin Bangemann to resolve coalition differences. Kohl and Strauss also met again in July. The party leaders agreed on a package of mild economic stimulants directed largely at the construction industry, a two-stage tax cut in 1986 and 1988, and new social legislation regarding rights to hold demonstrations and identity cards, all of which had been the source of bitter debate among the governing parties. These conversations momentarily stalled the criticism of the Kohl government as the West German public prepared for vacations in sunnier climes.

Prospects for Fall

In May and June, more serious steps the Kohl government could take to revive its sagging fortunes had been discussed, primarily more substantial attempts at economic stimulation or a cabinet shakeup. Although Kohl has yet to act on either, this fall could witness moves in either area. Kohl has resisted "pump priming" thus far largely out of a desire—supported by Finance Minister Stoltenberg—not to stray from his government's policy of fiscal austerity. One measure under consideration is to stimulate more hiring by combining the tax cuts into a single step. Stoltenberg, however, continues to object.

On the second issue, any number of reasons could account for Kohl's hesitation. The most likely one is that he did not wish to initiate a cabinet reshuffle for fear of reopening the dispute over portfolios specifically assigned to each coalition party, a sore point with the Christian Social Union. Strauss and the CSU have been demanding a greater role in Bonn, a move Kohl has sought to avoid. In addition, Kohl apparently prefers to do nothing precisely when people are pressing him to act. Nonetheless, several cabinet ministers are under attack for alleged imcompetence or corruption—chief among them Posts and Telecommunications Minister Schwarz-Schilling, Agricultural Minister Kiechle, and Defense Minister Woerner—who could be removed at any time. 25X1

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One step the government has taken is to begin a campaign to tar the Social Democrats with an anti-American brush. This became evident as early as last May when the Chancellor made that charge on the night of the North Rhine–Westphalian election. Family Minister and CDU General Secretary Geissler has been appointed point man for the attack, and his bitter commentaries on the state of the SPD's security policy often assign an anti-American bias to the opposition party. His campaign is likely to continue. 25X1

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Other actions the government may take depend largely on the prospects for state elections in Lower Saxony and Bavaria in 1986, as well as the federal election in 1987. Although the Christian Democrats are in a strong position in Lower Saxony, with a majority in the state legislature and a popular Minister-President in Ernst Albrecht, should they lose that state the Social Democrats would gain a majority of the seats in the *Bundesrat,* West Germany's upper legislative house. While the CSU's control of Bavaria is not threatened, a significant decline in votes would lower the influence of the CSU and Strauss in Bonn. And a poor showing in either state would reinforce concern about the national election in 1987. As a result, Kohl and his advisers probably will take some actions to try to revive political momentum in the fall, especially if the opinion polls continue to forecast further electoral setbacks. 25X1

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The Christian Social and Free Democratic leaders will also be looking ahead to coming elections, however, and therein lies a new challenge for the Kohl government. CSU and FDP politicians clearly hope to improve the profiles of their own parties and probably

[1] The "Sunday" question asks the respondent for whom he or she would vote if an election were held the coming Sunday. Most polls placed the CDU/CSU and SPD about even in the low 40s, but one gave the CDU only 39 percent to the SPD's 48 percent.

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believe it will be necessary to disassociate themselves from the mistakes of Kohl's administration. This will probably lead to renewed coalition disputes; in fact, sniping among the parties has already begun. After their meetings in June, Strauss noted publicly that he had not given up on a single-stage tax cut, one of the few issues on which the CSU and FDP agree. The two parties have also rekindled their dispute over the direction of Bonn's foreign policy in recent weeks. Foreign Minister and former FDP Chairman Genscher has called for a "new phase" in detente and *Ostpolitik,* to which Strauss has naturally objected. Genscher also laid claim, on his party's and his own behalf, to the Foreign Ministry after the 1987 election. Again, CSU spokesmen objected, and even Kohl weighed in with the observation that ministerial posts are nobody's property and remain subject to negotiations after the election.

We expect more CSU-FDP arguments in the fall as well as public critiques of the Chancellor's performance, especially from the CSU.

This will not make Kohl's job of presenting to the West German voter the image of a unified and competent government any easier.

Kohl's Personal Status

The summer also witnessed a good deal of speculation in West Germany regarding the Chancellor's personal future. There were even calls for his resignation from within the CDU itself.

had received reports from state-level party organizations indicating significant dissatisfaction with Kohl, some even going so far as to say that Kohl "must go." The meetings between Strauss and Bangemann in June and July helped still those voices, but we believe the discontent remains and that Kohl is aware of it.

Nonetheless, we believe that the Chancellor is safe for now. In the first place, there is no clear alternative to Kohl to lead the coalition. Stoltenberg remains the government's most respected figure, but his obduracy on maintaining fiscal austerity has alienated many voters, as well as the CSU. Another name often mentioned as a successor to Kohl is the Minister-President of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Lothar Spaeth. He is a particular favorite of Strauss. Spaeth is relatively inexperienced, however, especially in foreign affairs, and most observers agree that his time is yet to come.

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Time is also working in Kohl's favor. Numerous journalists have noted that a defeat in the election in Lower Saxony next June could force Kohl's ouster. That, in our view, would be too late. At that point, only six or seven months would be left before the federal election—too short a period for a new chancellor to establish himself and lead the Christian Democrats in an electoral campaign. Indeed, we believe that, unless Kohl is removed before the year's end, he is unlikely to be replaced before the 1987 election. The CDU and its coalition partners clearly want to avoid the sort of internecine struggle that would be required to replace an incumbent chancellor and this desire will become stronger as the election approaches. In sum, the longer Kohl remains in office, the better his prospects are. Yet, in view of his past performance and the dissatisfaction it has engendered, that is only a mixed blessing for the coalition in Bonn.

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West Germany: SPD Defense Dilemmas, Past and Present

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The Social Democrats' long history shows striking parallels to their current security policy debate. Today, as in the 1950s, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) is offering alternatives to NATO policies and stressing common East-West European interests vis-a-vis the superpowers. At the same time, party leaders frequently proclaim their loyalty to the Alliance as an institution—a stance the SPD adopted in 1960 following a string of electoral defeats. In the early 1960s, however, the party gained credibility with the voters only by accepting the substance of Alliance strategy and policies. Some Social Democratic moderates today are proposing a similar approach, and party leaders are likely to tone down their rhetoric on security issues to improve their prospects in the January 1987 election. Unlike in the 1960s, however, any basic changes in party policy probably would further intensify divisions both in the party leadership and among the increasingly articulate white-collar rank and file.

Historical Perspectives

The SPD has had an ambivalent position on defense throughout its history. Party leaders have rejected outright pacifism, but they have almost always stressed peace and international reconciliation. Their actions, meanwhile, generally have been pragmatic. In 1914, for example, the SPD parliamentary group voted for war credits in a wave of German nationalism. In 1928 an SPD-led government passed controversial appropriations for an armed cruiser the party had rejected in the previous electoral campaign. In the 1970s, Social Democratic chancellors strengthened the West German military and supported NATO's INF decision.

The closest parallel to the party's current situation, however, is its stand toward NATO and rearmament in the 1950s. The SPD vehemently opposed Bonn's accession to the Alliance in 1954-55 and rejected the creation of a West German army, the introduction of conscription, and the Bundeswehr's acquisition of nuclear-capable weapons in the mid- and late 1950s. Instead, the SPD proposed a series of schemes for collective security and nuclear-weapons-free zones in central Europe. Party leaders were deeply pro-Western and anti-Soviet, but their overriding goal was German unity. Only a nonaligned united Germany with limited military forces, they argued, could be acceptable to both the Soviet Union and the United States.

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The party's stand reflected not only principle but also the miscalculation that opposition to rearmament would win elections—a mistake repeated in 1983. Repeated opinion polls did indeed show strong opposition to rearmament—especially the Bundeswehr's so-called atomic armament in 1957-58—and a peace movement led largely by the SPD enjoyed widespread support in the mid- and late 1950s. Nonetheless, Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democrats won major election triumphs in 1953 and 1957, primarily because of the government's successful economic policies. International developments also made the SPD's ideas appear increasingly impractical, especially after Khrushchev bluntly told Social Democratic leaders in 1959 that the Soviets no longer had any interest in the party's plans for German unity—plans the Western powers had rejected all along.

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The SPD's first response to these frustrations was to proclaim its loyalty to NATO as an institution. In a famous Bundestag address in June 1960, assistant party Chairman Herbert Wehner declared the Alliance and the European Community to be the "basis and framework" of Bonn's external policy. In our view, however, Wehner's speech did not mark the major substantive change in Social Democratic policy that has often been contended.

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SPD defense experts continued to press for disengagement schemes that

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contradicted NATO policy despite the party's belated acceptance of Bonn's membership in the Alliance.[1]

More important, in our opinion, was the party's reconciliation with Alliance nuclear policy and doctrine in the early 1960s. Previously, the SPD had implicitly accepted NATO's posture of massive retaliation, but only to argue that conventional rearmament was superfluous. Beginning in 1960, however, SPD security experts joined other Western strategists in advocating stronger conventional forces as part of a graduated NATO deterrent. When the Kennedy administration embraced flexible response, the SPD found itself in much closer agreement with US and Alliance security policies than the Adenauer government, which feared that Washington was weakening its nuclear guarantee for Western Europe. As a result, the SPD was able to deflect charges of pacifism and anti-Americanism, distance itself from the peace movement, and pose as the champion of both detente and national defense.

The Present

In recent years, the SPD has reverted to many of its pre-1960 positions. Although almost all leading Social Democrats accept Bonn's military participation in NATO, they also have charged repeatedly that excessive alignment with Washington endangers West Germany's vital interests, particularly its good relations with the East. Some of their specific arms control proposals mark only nuanced differences with the Kohl government, but current Social Democratic rhetoric and underlying attitudes strikingly recall the 1950s:

- In opposing INF deployments, SPD leaders resurrected arguments that NATO nuclear policies violated West German sovereignty and threatened Europe's annihilation. As in 1957-58, the SPD played a leading role in a popular peace movement that often was one-sidedly anti-American.
- Egon Bahr and other Social Democrats have advocated a "security partnership" with the East that resembles the various collective security proposals of the 1950s. Bahr's conception leaves the two alliances intact, but it emphasizes common interests of the East and West Europeans vis-a-vis the superpowers.
- The SPD again is pushing plans for nuclear-free zones in central Europe virtually identical to schemes it advocated 30 years ago. The SPD concluded a model agreement on a chemical-weapons-free zone with East Berlin last June and is negotiating similar disarmament agreements with various East European Communist parties.
- Even more than in the 1950s, the SPD is playing down the Soviet military threat. Party leaders have argued repeatedly that NATO overestimates Soviet military power, and they tend to argue that Soviet foreign policy is basically defensive.
- The Social Democrats consistently criticize US arms control positions. Last month, for instance, party spokesmen sharply attacked Washington's rejection of the Soviets' proposal for a nuclear weapons test moratorium.

As before 1960, these positions probably weaken the SPD's appeal to centrist voters. Some recent statements of Social Democratic leaders suggest they fear the accusations of anti-Americanism and neutralism.

To ward off charges of neutralism and anti-Americanism, Party Chairman Brandt has stressed the SPD's commitment to the West, and Bundestag Caucus Chairman Vogel said recently that the SPD stood by Herbert Wehner's famous pledge of loyalty in 1960.

[1] Journalists often cite the SPD's Godesberg Program of 1959 as the beginning of its shift in Alliance policy. In fact, the program makes no mention of NATO and repeats the party's longstanding calls for reunification, collective security, and a nuclear-weapons-free zone in central Europe.

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As yet, however, the SPD has failed to resolve its differences with NATO policies. Many party spokesmen have called for raising the nuclear threshold by reducing the conventional imbalance in Europe, but they almost invariably suggest arms control as a virtual panacea and reject higher military spending. In addition, Egon Bahr and other Social Democrats repeatedly have questioned the morality of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture—although in the SDI discussion they also argue that mutual assured destruction is preferable to plans for defense against ballistic missiles.

Prospects

The SPD may tone down its statements on defense as the 1987 election approaches, but only at the risk of internal divisions. Although the party's probable candidate for chancellor, Johannes Rau, has made few public statements on foreign policy, his US interlocutors say he has strong ties to the more conservative Schmidt wing of the party. Any major substantive change in party policy, however, almost certainly would provoke vehement dissent among both the leadership and the rank and file. Unlike in the early 1960s, the membership now has a major voice in party security policy: local SPD conventions, for example, took the lead in rejecting INF deployments in 1983. Further, the membership is much more highly educated and white collar, according to academic studies. Prominent SPD defense spokesmen—including Egon Bahr, Horst Ehmke, and Karsten Voigt—almost certainly would resist the abandonment of their pet concepts of security partnership and common East-West European interests. Finally, the party currently lacks strong national leaders willing to impose unified positions on both the elite and the rank and file.

Because of these internal pressures, the SPD probably will be unable to change its course as clearly as in the early 1960s. Instead, it is more likely to proclaim loyalty to NATO while attacking a range of NATO and US policies such as SDI, INF, and increases in military spending. In addition, it may play down security issues and concentrate its fire on the Kohl government's economic policies. Should the SPD participate in government after the 1987 election, its unresolved divisions on defense issues are likely to reemerge with a vengeance—especially if the party leadership is forced to moderate its policies under pressure from the Allies and its coalition partners. (S NF)

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Yugoslavia: Regional and Ethnic Makeup, 1981



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Yugoslavia: A Growing Albanian Minority

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Rapid population growth among the Albanians, Yugoslavia's poorest and most alienated major ethnic group, is sharpening regional tensions and eroding the regime's long-term ability to maintain stability. The demographic shift is most dramatic in Kosovo, a heavily Albanian-populated province in the Serbian Republic that was the scene of serious disorders in 1981. But major political, economic, and security problems also loom in several other regions with growing Albanian populations.

Demographic Shift

Yugoslavia's 1.9 million Albanians are its largest non-Slavic minority, inhabiting several regions bordering on Albania. Some 70 percent live in Serbia's autonomous province of Kosovo, a region once the core of Serbia's medieval kingdom and which still evokes strong emotions among Serbs. The remainder live mainly in Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia proper. The Albanians suffer the country's highest rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and other earmarks of underdevelopment. They are heartily disliked by the Serbs and regarded with contempt or indifference by most other Yugoslav ethnic groups; they, in turn, strongly resent Serbs and other nearby Slavic groups. Yugoslavia's Albanians, numbering about two-thirds of the population of Albania itself, constitute proportionally Europe's largest divided population.

The number of Yugoslavia's Albanians has increased steadily over the years. With the highest birthrate of any major European ethnic group, the Albanians have moved up from 3.7 percent of Yugoslavia's total population in 1921 to roughly 8 percent today.[1] They now outnumber three of the country's major Slavic groups—the Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Slovenes—and are behind only the Serbs, Croats, and Slavic Muslims. With the exception of the Muslims, who are a strong minority group in Bosnia-Hercegovina, they are the only major ethnic group without a republic of their own.

[1] Data in this article are drawn from Yugoslav censuses and other official open sources.

The demographic shift in favor of the Albanians has been most dramatic and politically inflammatory in Kosovo, a region under tight Serbian control until 1966 when Tito ousted his hardline Serb security chief, Aleksandar Rankovic. The proportion of Albanians in Kosovo's population edged up from under 67 to 77.4 percent between 1961 and the last official census in 1981. The number of Serbs and Montenegrins in the same period dropped from 27.5 to under 15 percent. The shift was due both to the high natural increase in the Albanian population—more than seven times that of the Serbs and more than twice that of the less numerous Montenegrins—and to a net outflow of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo after Rankovic's removal.

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The demographic shift is likely to continue and possibly accelerate. By 1991, when the next census is conducted, Albanians probably will account for 80 to 84 percent of Kosovo's population while the Serb-Montenegrin share will probably drop to 8 to 12 percent. The actual percentages will depend on the pace of the Serb-Montenegrin emigration as well as birth and death rates. Although information on emigration provided by Kosovo and Serbian authorities is often contradictory, piecemeal, and politically biased, the data suggest that net Serb-Montenegrin outflow is now running between 3,000 and 7,000 persons a year.

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Albanians have also made population gains in other regions. In Macedonia, they moved up from 17 to 20 percent of the population during 1971-81. Population growth rates among Albanians have been about twice those of the Macedonians, and Yugoslav media report an inflow of hundreds of Albanians yearly from Kosovo into Macedonia. Official concern is reportedly mounting over the growing Albanian presence in the republic's western counties.

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

The Albanian population has been more stable in Montenegro and in Serbia proper, totaling, according to official statistics, only 6.5 and 1.3 percent, respectively, of those regions' total populations in 1981. But Montenegrin leaders have hinted at rising anti-Albanian sentiment. In Serbia, an exodus of Serbs from counties near the border with Kosovo has prompted incendiary articles in the Serbian press. Even more foreboding, the Serbian leadership has acknowledged a rash of attacks by Serbs on Albanian homes and shops in recent months in Serbia proper.

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Political Representation

Despite their demographic gains, Albanians have had a mixed record in securing political representation in line with their numbers. The biggest progress has been registered in Kosovo. But the sledding is still tough in Macedonia and Montenegro, where other ethnic groups dominate the political machinery.

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In Kosovo, despite the Serbian-inspired crackdown after the 1981 riots, the Albanians have succeeded in reversing decades of Serb-Montenegrin overrepresentation in the political apparatus. A Kosovo paper reported in June 1982 that Albanians account for 77 percent of the Kosovo Assembly and 71 and 80 percent, respectively, of the Kosovo delegates in the Yugoslav and Serbian Assemblies. The figures are in line with their 77.5 percent of the local population about that time. With a two-thirds share of Kosovo party membership, they also make up over two-thirds of the province's party Central Committee, a ratio largely unaffected by the sweeping turnover in that body in 1982. And Albanians have solid representation in top provincial judicial, security, and governmental posts.

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

In Macedonia, however, where they account for 20 percent of the population, Albanians hold no top judicial or security posts and are underrepresented in high republican party and governmental jobs. In Montenegro, where they number 6.5 percent of the population, Albanians have representatives on the republic's top governmental councils but a tiny share on the party Central Committee and no key judicial or security posts.

Youth Problems Ahead

The age structure of Kosovo's population gives non-Albanian Yugoslavs grounds for concern. The province has proportionally the country's youngest population, with two-thirds of the inhabitants under 30 in 1981. The large and growing number of Albanians entering peak childbearing age virtually assures fast Albanian population growth into the next century, even if birthrates decline. Both federal and Kosovo projections foresee Kosovo's population rising at or above current rates.

Prospects look dim for major birth control efforts any time soon, despite scarcely concealed pressure on Kosovo Albanian authorities from Serbs and other groups. The leading Kosovo Serb paper in late May, for instance, declared that the province's high population increase is a problem that "cannot be bypassed" and charged that "Albanian nationalists and irredentists . . . support as high a birthrate as possible." Meanwhile, neighboring Albania sets an unhealthy example in the eyes of Serbs, promoting fast population growth to increase the country's economic and political potential.

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Even more foreboding are the economic and security implications of the age structure. The 1981 disturbances took place at a time when 300,000 Kosovars—20 percent of the province's population—entered the 15- to 24-year age bracket. By 1991 some

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420,000 will be in this group. This group has the highest propensity to vent nationalist feelings, as witnessed by the disproportionate number of young people arrested during and since the 1981 outbreaks. It also faces the worst youth unemployment in the country.

Few prospects exist for significant changes in the job picture unless Kosovo's economic growth far outstrips the province's 3-percent annual population rise, not likely any time soon. Although Kosovo's 1982 gross social product (roughly equivalent to GNP) was 3.5 times the 1962 level, per capita gross social product only doubled because of the population growth. Moreover, Kosovo lost ground to other regions in the same period in per capita social product, falling from 33.8 to 28.5 percent of the national average and to less than one-sixth that of Slovenia, the most developed republic.

Prospects

Yugoslavia's shifting demographic balance will probably continue to fuel political, ethnic, and economic tensions indefinitely. The Serbian leadership, publicly committed to reasserting political control over Kosovo, will probably find it increasingly hard to exert its influence as the Albanian population mounts and Serbs and Montenegrins flee. The Macedonian leadership may face growing troubles as western Macedonia becomes increasingly Albanian. And in Serbia proper, where a small Albanian minority is exposed to an increasingly frustrated and nationalistic Serb population, ethnic strife may intensify.

The more distant northern republics offer Serbia little comfort, as they share with the Albanians a fear of Serbian nationalism. Yet, they too appear to share Serbian concerns that to grant the Albanians a republic of their own could stimulate Albanian nationalism and destabilize the post-Tito order. And if the security situation again deteriorates, as it did in Kosovo four years ago, they may be forced to accept a new Serbian-led crackdown as an alternative to broader unrest.

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Economic News in Brief

Western Europe

New program is helping British export firms in Midlands overcome language, legal, and cultural problems in doing business abroad . . . collaborative effort between higher education and industry encouraged by Thatcher government . . . similar projects needed throughout the United Kingdom, which lags far behind major competitors in cross-cultural communications training. 25X1

Farmers in southern France have been agitating against Spanish entry into EC . . . demonstration in Marseille last month ended with pillaging trucks carrying imported produce . . . protests sparked by overproduction of fruit and vegetables, weak demand, and increased Italian competition following lira devaluation last month . . . disturbances likely to escalate as 1 January enlargement of EC nears. 25X1

Spanish consumer price index fell in June for first time since February 1972, slowing inflation to an annual rate of 8.9 percent . . . lowest 12-month increase since March 1973, largely due to lower prices of domestic and imported foods . . . government reaffirmed commitment to further reduce inflation rate, still about 3 percentage points above average of EC partners. 25X1

Dublin will impose a 12-month wage freeze in December on all workers in the public sector . . . part of government program to reduce budget deficit and foreign debt . . . will add to strains in coalition government since Labor Party will oppose plan . . . also faces vigorous opposition from unions, which want spending cuts imposed elsewhere. 25X1

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Looking Ahead

August	
West Germany	*Bribery trial of former Economics Minister von Lamsdorff starts tomorrow* . . . one consequence of the "Flick Affair" involving illegal party financing schemes . . . observers will be watching for new revelations that could implicate other politicians, including Chancellor Kohl. 25X1
September	
West Germany	*SPD-Green talks begin this month in Hesse* . . . Greens demanding control of ministries for both Justice and Environment, but Social Democrats offering only one . . . dominant pragmatic faction among Hessian Greens likely to push for compromise. 25X1
East-West	*Seventh round of Conference on Disarmament in Europe begins on 10 September in Stockholm* . . . hints from Moscow that East may soften emphasis on declaratory measures . . . might prompt renewed calls from some Allies for greater flexibility on the West's substantive measures for confidence- and security building as the treaty deadline in July 1986 approaches. 25X1
	Thirty-seventh round of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks open on 26 September in Vienna . . . United Kingdom and West Germany will continue to push within NATO for new Western initiative building on Eastern proposal of last February . . . probably believe proposal offering first-stage reductions in only US and Soviet troops, coupled with strict verification measures, would put East in no-win situation—either refusing modified version of own proposal or acceding to Western verification demands. 25X1

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